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Abstract
The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the as-
sumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in
which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the
outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility.
In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payoff is a natural reference point for
evaluating each period’s payoff, and loss aversion implies that decreases are treated more
severely than increases. We characterize the equilibria of inﬁnitely repeated games for the
case of extreme loss aversion, and show how these are related to the equilibria of stochastic
games with state-independent transitions.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: C72.
1 Introduction
Expected utility dominates the analysis of game-theoretic situations, despite overwhelming
evidence that it fails to adequately describe or predict human behavior. Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) prospect theory proposes an alternative to expected utility in which outcomes are
evaluated with respect to a reference point. Such reference dependent utility functions are suc-
cessful in explaining many systematic deviations from the maximization of expected utility.
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1Rabin (1996) writes that “reference dependence deserves to be, and is gradually becoming, an
important part of economic modeling.”
The most striking result of the investigation of reference-dependent utility functions is the
demonstration of existence of loss aversion. Experimental works in both the psychological
and the economic literature suggest that people are motivated to minimize losses (relative to
a reference point) much more than they are motivated to maximize gain. For example, Fish-
burn and Kochenberger (1979) empirically assessed utility functions over changes in wealth.
They found that the slope of the utility function below the reference point was on average
almost ﬁve times as steep as the slope above the reference point. Other examples emphasiz-
ing the different treatment of losses and gains (and implicitly or explicitly implying reference
dependence) are De Dreu, Emans and Van de Vliert (1992), Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990, 1991), Kramer (1989), Taylor (1991), and Tversky and
Kahneman (1992)). Tversky and Kahneman (1991) state that “much experimental evidence
indicates that choice depends on the status quo or reference level: changes of reference point
often lead to reversals of preference.” The choices dealt with by Tversky and Kahneman were
single person decisions. Decision makers in their model evaluate situations while taking into
account how the situation was arrived at (reference dependence) and giving different treatment
to increases and decreases (loss aversion).
We present a model which implements the consequences of their model for the case of
repeated interaction between decision makers. Many interactions between decision makers
(persons, corporations, countries or other entities) are repeated continuously over a period of
time. It is reasonable to expect the actions taken in each encounter to depend on the outcomes
of previous contacts. This mode of repeated encounters is a good candidate for modeling with
repeated games. In a repeated game, the same interaction is repeated a number of times, with
payoffs at each stage depending on the actions taken by the players (the participants) at that
stage. For a survey on repeated games, see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994a, 1994b and
1994c).
The methods generally used in the mathematics and economics literature for evaluating
streams of payoffs received in repeated games are (i) the sum of the stage payoffs, (ii) the
average payoff, or (iii) a discounted sum of the payoffs. Assuming that loss aversion and refer-
ence dependence are relevant factors in evaluating outcomes, one should take into account not
2only the stage payoffs themselves (the material payoffs), but also the differences between pairs
of payoffs. Thus, the stage payoffs, in addition to being carriers of utility, are also reference
points for future payoffs. For instance, an increasing stream of payoffs might be preferred to
one with decreases, if the sum of the material payoffs is the same in both cases. As in Tversky
and Kahneman (1991), “The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes
below the reference state) loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference
state).”
In the model presented here, we assume that the stream of payoffs received in a repeated
game is evaluated with the utilities of the outcomes depending on the outcomes of previous
rounds. Losses will be regarded more severely than corresponding gains. Depending on the
importance of the changes in payoffs relative to the importance of the material payoffs them-
selves, this change in evaluation can lead to equilibria totally different from those found in
models with classical methods of evaluating streams of payoffs.
Shalev (1997a) axiomatized loss aversion in a multi-period model, in which a single deci-
sion maker evaluated payoff streams. Preferences over streams of payoffs were characterized
with a set of axioms, which include a weaker version of von-Neuman and Morgenstern’s in-
dependence axiom, that together accomodate preferences violating temporal monotonicity1.
Examples have been given both in the economic literature and in that of psychology, where
subjects have expressed preferences for streams in a way that violates temporal monotonicity.
For example, subjects preferred increasing streams of money to decreasing ones so strongly
that even dominated streams were preferred in some cases to those dominated by them. Ref-
erences to such cases are given in Shalev (1997a). The axioms in Shalev’s model are similar
to those in Gilboa (1989), which characterize variation aversion. This is no coincidence, and
in Section 5 we show an equivalence between variation and losses in a repeated game with
inﬁnitely many periods, when the differences between pairs of payoffs (losses and gains) are
assumed to have more importance than the actual material payoffs.
Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) deal with games in which the utilities of the players
may change during the play of the game. They derive an extension of the concept of Nash
equilibrium for these games which they call credible equilibrium. Similarly to the situation
1Temporal monotonicity states that if the outcome of stream v1 is preferred to the outcome of stream v2 in
every single period, then stream v1 should be preferred to stream v2.
3they present, in the model proposed in this paper the utilities of the players from outcomes
received in the present can depend on the actions chosen in the past. However, in contrast to
their paper, where the changes in utilities are exogenous and given as part of the description of
the game, in the model we present here the changes in utilities are endogenous and are derived
speciﬁcally from differences betwen pairs of consecutive payoffs.
In Rabin (1993) assumptions about fairness are used to modify the evaluation of outcomes
in a game. Similarly to what we do here, the modiﬁcation of the evaluation of outcomes
is endogenous. In both the model presented by Rabin and in the model presented here, the
exogenous speciﬁcation of the game initially includes only the material payoffs, and the psy-
chological assumptions are used to modify the evaluations of the outcomes in a consistent
manner. The modiﬁcations lead to the set of equilibria being different from the set of equilibria
obtained when only the material payoffs are taken into consideration. The results obtained by
Rabin have economic signiﬁcance, reﬂecting certain stylized facts about fairness. Similarly,
the results obtained from the model with loss aversion are signiﬁcant in that they reﬂect certain
conclusions found in experiments on loss aversion, such as those described in Tversky and
Kahneman (1991).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we examine the equilibria of three well-
known games when using loss aversion evaluation, and compare these to the case of regular
evaluation. Section 3 formalizes the model. Section 4 discusses ﬁnitely repeated games, while
Section 5 deals with inﬁnitely repeated games, concentrating on situations with extreme loss
aversion. Section 6 contains some ﬁnal remarks and directions for future research.
2 Basic Examples
The payoff evaluation used in the examples in this section is according to the following deﬁ-
nitions. A more detailed discussion including the motivation of the deﬁnitions is given in Sec-
tion 3. A (one-shot) game G is given by G
=
hN
;S
;h
i,w h e r eN
=
f1
;2
g is the set of players2,
Si
;i
= 1
;2 the ﬁnite sets of pure strategies of the players; S
=S1
￿S2,a n dh:S
!IR 2 the payoff
function. The game G is repeated T times. At each stage 1
￿ t
￿ T the players each choose
2We deal with more than two players in the general model.
42.1 Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
In the ﬁrst example, loss-aversion evaluation can induce cooperation in the ﬁrst periods of the
ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. With regular evaluation, defection at all stages is the only
equilibrium outcome. The material payoffs at each stage are given in the following table:
C D
C 4, 4 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
C and D represent cooperation and defection respectively. The stage game is repeated T
times. For a close to one, the only equilibrium is the well-known one with both players de-
fecting at every stage. However, for a sufﬁciently close to zero (a situation where extreme
loss-aversion is assumed) and strictly positive loss-aversion coefﬁcients li, we can ﬁnd equi-
librium paths with cooperation continuing until the stage before last. An example of such a
strategy pair that is in equilibrium is the following. Both players have the same strategy, which
doesn’t depend on the history, and consists of playing C in the ﬁrst T
￿1 periods, and D in
the last period. The payoff for each player is 4a
￿
(1
￿a
)3li
T .F o raclose enough to zero this
cannot be improved by any deviation, since the ﬁrst term is negligible, and given the strategy
of the other player, with any deviation the multiplier of
(1
￿a
)li
T is strictly less than
￿3( t h e
sum of the decreases). For any T, the path with both players playing D at each stage can be
supported in equilibrium, showing that loss-aversion evaluation enables cooperation, but does
not necessarily induce it.
2.2 Finitely Repeated Battle of the Sexes
The second example has the material payoffs of the stage game given by the battle of the sexes.
These payoffs are:
A B
A 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 2
If the game is repeated twice, with a sufﬁciently close to zero, then there are four pure
strategy equilibrium outcomes. In two of these, one of the coordinated outcomes is repeated
twice. In the other two, the equilibrium has the ﬁrst round outcome of
(B
;A
), giving payoffs
6of
(0
;0
), and then either
(A
;A
) or
(B
;B
). A deviation by a player in the ﬁrst round leads to the
players playing that players least preferred coordinated outcomein thesecond round. There are
other equilibriaalso (withmixedactions beingplayed), such as thefollowing,alsowitha close
to zero: both players play mixed actions in the ﬁrst round, player 1 playing A with probability
5/7 and player 2 playing A with probability 2/7. In the second round, if the outcome in the
ﬁrst round was (A,A) or (B,B), this outcome is repeated. If the outcome was one of the non-
coordinated ones, they play mixed actions, with player 1 playing A with probability 2/3 and
player 2 playing A with probability 1/3.
For more than 2 repetitions, the analysis of equilibria becomes more complex. For in-
stance, it is not true that the players’ actions in the last period (period T) always maximizetheir
expected stage payoff, given the other players action. In some cases they may be willing to
receive a lower expected payoff in round T if this gives a smaller chance of a loss relative to
the outcome in round T-1. To see this, we now examine in detail the equilibrium actions in the
last period of the thrice-repeated battle of the sexes, based on the outcome of the second period
(the only relevant historical information).
1. Outcome of (0,0) in period 2
In this case, since there can be no losses when comparing the second and third periods,
the only factor is maximization of expected payoffs for the third period, i.e. any of the 3
Nash equilibria of the stage game could be part of an equilibrium.
2. Outcome of (2,1) in period 2
(A,A) and (B,B) are the only pure action proﬁles that could constitute part of an equilib-
rium, and they do so for any l’s and any a. Mixed actions that could constitute part of an
equilibrium are those for which player 2 plays A with probability 1
3 and player 1 plays
A with probability
2a
+
(1
￿a
)l2
3a
+2
(1
￿a
)l2. When a
= 1 this is equal to 2/3, and when a
= 0 this is
equal to 1/2. Thus, as losses become more important, player 1 places more weight on the
action that could lead to player 2’s favourable outcome. Note that player 2 is indifferent
between her two actions (which is why she can play a mixed action), even though they
give her different expected material payoffs.
3. Outcome of (1,2) in period 2
This case is analogous to the previous one, reversing the roles of the two players.
72.3 Finitely Repeated Matching Pennies
The last example is the game of matching pennies, with the following stage payoff matrix:
H T
H 1, -1 -1, 1
T -1, 1 1, -1
At the last stage, both players will mix their actions with equal probabilities in any equi-
librium, regardless of the values of the li’s and a. If the number of stages is large enough,
then pure actions can be supported in equilibrium at earlier stages with threats of punishment
after deviation from the equlibrium path. There also exists an equilibrium with both players
playing (1/2,1/2) unconditionally at all stages. We now investigate the possible equilibria in a
two-stage game. At the second stage, both players prefer 1 to
￿1, for any values of li and a,
after any ﬁrst period outcome. Therefore, any equilibrium has both players mixing H and T
with probability 1
2 each. Moving now to the ﬁrst stage, and taking as given the second stage
actions, an outcome of 1 at the ﬁrst stage gives player i a (loss aversion) utility of
a
￿
(1
￿a
)li
2 ,
and an outcome of
￿1g i v e sa
2. Thus, for li
> 2a
1
￿a, player i prefers
￿1 to 1 at the ﬁrst stage. If
a is small enough, and li
> 0f o ri
= 1
;2, then the only possible equilibrium has both players
mixing equiprobably also at stage 1. A similar analysis shows that for a 3-stage game with a
close enough to zero, there are no equilibria with pure actions at the ﬁrst stage. All equilibria
start with both players playing each of their actions equiprobably. In the second stage of an
equilibrium path there could either be pure actions, repeating the realized outcome of the ﬁrst
stage, or equiprobable mixtures by both players. The third and last stage of any equilibrium is
with equiprobable mixtures by both players. When there are more than 3 stages, pure actions
can be supported in equilibria at the beginning of the game, with threats of punishment (by
mixing) for deviating at the ﬁrst stage. Such punishments are not necessary for stages after the
ﬁrst one and before the last 2, as repeating the previous outcome is optimal for both players.
To summarize, this simple example shows that when differences between pairs of outcomes
are taken into consideration, the set of equilibria changes considerably. This same game, with-
out loss aversion (either li
= 0
8i or a
= 1) admits only one equilibrium path - both players
mixing equiprobably at each and every stage.
83 Notation and the Underlying Model
We use the following notation, some of which was given for the examples of the previous
section, and is repeated here for convenience.
We start with the elements of a repeated game with loss aversion evaluation. The ﬁrst three
items deﬁne the stage game.
The set of players is N
=
f1
;2
;
:
:
:
;n
g.
The (ﬁnite) set of pure actions of player i in the stage game is Si. The set of action n-tuples
is S
= S1
￿S2
￿
:
:
:
￿S n .
The payoff function for player i in the stage game (material payoffs) is given by hi : S
!IR .
The vector of payoffs for all the players is denoted h
= h1
￿h2
￿
:
:
:
￿h n .
This deﬁnes the stage game with the material payoffs,
hN
;S
;h
i.
The number of stages in the game is T. T
2
f 1
;2
;
:
:
:
g
[¥ . The case of ﬁnite T is treated
in Section 4, and inﬁnitely repeated games are addressed in Section 5.
The loss aversion coefﬁcients of the players are l
=
( l i
) i
2 N , with li
￿ 0 for each i. Higher
values of li indicate greater loss aversion of player i. li
= 0 indicates that player i is not loss
averse, and cares only about material payoffs.
The constant a
2
[0
;1
] is situation dependent and reﬂects how relevant loss aversion is to
the situation. The closer a is to 0, the more relevant are the losses relative to the material
payoffs. This is analogous to the scaling factor X used in Rabin (1993), where higher values
of X give more importance to the material payoffs. We assume here for convenience that a is
common for all the players, but a model could be developed where ai gave the the relevance of
the losses for player i. This cannot be done simply by modifying the li’s.
The above deﬁnitions are the data of the game. The following items give the strategies, and
the evaluation of the payoffs.
The set of possible histories until (not including) stage t is denoted by Ht
= St
￿1.
A (behavioral) strategy of player i in the repeated game is given by si
=
( s t
i
) t
= 1
;
:
:
:
;T,w h e r e
s t
i:H t
! D
(S i
) is the single period (mixed) action of player i for period t.
We denote by Si the set of player i’s strategies in the repeated game.
9A proﬁle of actions in period t is st
=
( s t
i
) i
2 N .
v t
i
=h i
( s t
)denotes the material payoff to player i in period t. The material payoffs for the
set of players is given by vt
=
( v t
i
) i
2 N .
The loss aversion payoff for player i at period t is deﬁned as ft
i
= min
f0
;li
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
g,f o r
t
￿ 2, The function f gives the disutility obtained from losses (relative to the previous period).
In a similar fashion one could add utility from gains (which loss aversion implies would be
less than the absolute value of the disutility of comparable losses). One of the simplifying
assumptions we make is ignoring the effect of gains and focusing only on the effect of losses.
When the game is repeated inﬁnitely, this is without loss of generality, as we show in Lemma 1
that the average increase in payoffs (between adjacent stages) is equal to the average decrease
in payoffs. Shalev (1997a) gives a more general model (in a decision theoretical setup, i.e.
with a single player) in which both gains and losses are taken into account.
The utility evaluation of a stream, as used in the examples of Section 2, is given by
ui
(v1
i
;
:
:
:
;v T
i
)
=
1
T
"
a
T
å
t
= 1
v t
i
+
(1
￿a
)
T
å
t
=2
f t
i
#
(2)
This is player i’s T-period utility evaluation.
The function u is based on a multiperiod representation of the value function used by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1991), incorporating loss aversion and reference dependence. The refer-
ence point for evaluating the payoff at stage t (for t
> 1) is vt
￿1. Thus, we assume that the
reference points fully adjust to new payoffs, the moment they are received. For a discussion
on the speed of adjustment of reference points and the implications for different equilibrium
concepts, see Shalev (1997b).
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l esinduces a distribution over the sequences of outcomes. As described
in Section 2, each stream is evaluated according to (2), and the expectation is taken over these
evaluations. As usual, s is a loss-aversion (Nash) equilibrium if no player i can strictly gain
from a unilateral deviation to a strategy s
0
i.
104 Remarks on Equilbria of the Finitely Repeated Game
1. Repetition of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game
Without taking loss aversion into account, the repetition of a Nash equlibrium of the
stage game always represents an equilibrium path of a ﬁnitely repeated supergame (e.g.
with strategies independent of the history). This is true also when loss aversion is used
in the evaluationof the payoff streams3. If the number of repetitions is large enough, and
a is close enough to zero, any pair of actions repeated at each stage (and not just those
representing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game) can be supported in equilibrium
for most of the periods of the repeated game (the last few may have to include mixed
actions).
2. Zero-sum stage games
If one is only interested in the material payoffs (and not the loss aversion payoffs), then
for a zero-sum stage game the equilibria are with each player’s expected stage payoffs
being equal to her value in the stage game. However, with loss aversion evaluation, the
repeated game is not generally zero-sum, as the evaluation of differences is not symmet-
rical for positive and negative payoffs. Since one player’s gain is the other player’s loss,
and lossesareevaluatedmoreseverelythan gains,therepeated zero-sum stagegamewith
loss aversion evaluation becomes a game with non-positive payoffs when loss-aversion
is highly relevant (a near zero).
3. Mixed actions and loss aversion evaluation
With (strictly) mixed actions at stage t
￿1 and loss aversion evaluation of payoffs, the
players’ actions for stage t (2
￿ t
￿ T) will in general depend on the outcome of stage
t
￿1, which is known only after stage t
￿1. This is in contrast with the situation where
the evaluation is simply the sum (or weighted sum, discounted sum, or average) of the
material payoffs, in which case, along the equilibrium path, the actions need not depend
upon the outcomes of previous randomizations. The expectation of the payoff for the en-
3It is interesting to note that if we include a premium for gains (in addition to the penalty for losses), then this
is not necessarily true. For this method of evaluation, with a close to zero, the players prefer to have as low a
payoff as possible in the ﬁrst period. In this case, some single-stage Nash equilibria cannot arise as the ﬁrst stage
of equilibria of the repeated game. An example is the action proﬁle
(A
;A
) for the twice-repeated battle of the
sexes, which cannot appear as the ﬁrst stage of an equilibrium.
11tire game with loss-aversion evaluation is not just a function of the expected one-round
payoffs, but a function of the expected one-round payoffs and the expected differences
(and the direction of these differences) between pairs of adjacent stage payoffs. There-
fore, to calculate the expected future payoff from any point in the game, one must take
into consideration the realization of the previous outcome.
4. Existence of loss-aversion equilibria
For every ﬁnitely repeated game with loss-aversion evalution of the payoffs there exists
a loss aversion equilibrium. One can regard the repeated game as an extensive game in
which the payoffs at each terminal node are calculated according to the loss aversion
formulae given in the model. This is a ﬁnite game, and therefore, any Nash equilibrium
of this game is a loss aversion equilibrium of the (equivalent) repeated game with loss
aversion evaluation. Since a Nash equilibrium is known to exist for any such game, a
loss aversion equilibrium exists for the equivalent game with loss aversion evaluation.
5. Dominating actions
Strictly dominating actions in the stage game need not be played in a loss aversion equi-
librium (except in the last stage). This can be seen in the example of the prisoners’
dilemma in the previous section. With regular evaluation (utility is the sum of the stage
payoffs), backwards induction leads us to infer that the only equilibrium path has the
players playing their dominating action at each stage.
5 Loss Aversion in Inﬁnitely Repeated Games
Given an inﬁnite stream of stage payoffs
(v1
i
;v2
i
;
:
:
:
), we use the following formula (limit of
averages) to evaluate the loss-aversion payoff:
ui
(v1
i
;v2
i
;
:
:
:
)
= lim
T
!¥
sup
1
T
"
a
T
å
t
=1
vt
i
+
(1
￿a
)
T
å
t
=2
f t
i
#
: (3)
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l esis a loss-aversion equilibrium for the inﬁnite case if the expected payoff
from s cannot be improved upon by any player with a unilateral deviation from si.
12It is interesting to note that an inﬁnitely repeated game with loss aversion payoffs can be
modeled by an appropriate stochastic game. The set of states of the game is the set of action
tuples, that we denoted by S, plus one initial state, s0. The transition matrix is simply that
from any state, playing actions s
2 S causes a sure transfer to state s. Such transition matrices
characterize the gameas a stochasticgamewith state-independenttransitions. The stagepayoff
of player i, given state s
2 S and actions s
0
2S,i sa h i
(s
)
+
(1
￿a
)
(hi
(s
)
￿hi
(s
0
)
)
￿. The payoffs
from actions s at state s0 are h
(s
). Taking the limit of the averages evaluation, we arrive at the
formula (3).
Recall that the purpose of a is to represent the importance of the material payoffs relative
to the importance of the changes in the material payoffs over time. When a is close to one this
represents low relevance of loss aversion, and when a is close to zero this represents a situation
where loss aversion is highly relevant. Two interesting cases are the extremes. The case a
= 1
is when only the material payoffs count, which is equivalentto a regular repeated game without
discounting. The case a
= 0 is when the material payoffs are “immaterial”, and only losses
count. This is the situation we investigate in this section. The results reﬂect fully the loss
aversion aspects of the evaluation. We are not pretending that this is a realistic assumption for
common situations, but the analysis of this extreme case can be compared to results for a
6
= 0
and a
= 1. Similar propositions to the three given in this section hold for intermediate values
of a. A loss aversion equilibrium in an inﬁnitely repeated game with a
= 0 is characterized by
each player minimizing the average decrease in her payoff stream. As shown in the following
lemma, the utility of a stream of payoffs v
=
( v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
)to a player i is equal to
￿li (the loss
aversion coefﬁcient of the player) multiplied by the average decrease between pairs of payoffs
(where increases are treated as a decrease of zero).
Notethattheutilityofapayoffstreamv
=
(v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
)whena
=0isgivenbyl ilimT
!¥sup 1
T å
T
t
=2
(vt
i
￿
vt
￿1
i
)
￿,w h e r ex
￿ denotes min
(0
;x
).
Lemma 1 For any payoff stream v
=
( v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
)from a repeated game with a
= 0, the follow-
ing equations hold:
ui
(v
)
= li lim
T
!¥
sup
1
T
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
￿
13= li lim
T
!¥
sup
￿1
T
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
+
= li lim
T
!¥
sup
￿1
2T
T
å
t
=2
jvt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
j
Proof: For any T
￿ 2 it is true that
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
=v T
￿v 1
and that
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
=
T
å
t
= 2
( v t
i
￿v t
￿ 1
i
)
+
+
T
å
t
= 2
( v t
i
￿v t
￿ 1
i
)
￿
Therefore, since
ui
(v
)
=l i lim
T
!¥
sup
1
T
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
￿
;
we have
ui
(v
)
= li lim
T
!¥
sup
1
T
 
(vT
i
￿v1
i
)
￿
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
+
!
= li lim
T
!¥
sup
￿1
T
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
+
since vT
i and v1
i are both bounded, as game payoffs. The last equality now follows from the fact
that
T
å
t
=2
jvt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
j
=
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
+
￿
T
å
t
=2
(vt
i
￿vt
￿1
i
)
￿
for all T
￿ 2. (Lemma 1)
14Since any payoff stream will give a non-positive payoff evaluation, a payoff of zero cannot
be improved upon. Thus, any strategy path where the players play ﬁxed actions is in equilib-
rium, and is also efﬁcient. To fully characterize the equilibria in the inﬁnitely repeated game,
we will use a modiﬁcation of the Folk Theorem. Any equilibrium is characterized by the pay-
offs being feasible and individually rational for all the players. We now investigate what are
the feasible and individually rational payoffs for loss-aversion evaluation. First we investigate
the feasible payoffs.
5.1 Feasibility
Given a stage game G
=
( N
;S
;h
) , the feasible payoffs at each stage belong to the set V
=
f
(h1
(s
)
;h2
(s
)
;
:
:
:
;h n
(s
)
)
j s
2 S
g. The following proposition characterizes the nature of the
payoff evaluations that are feasible given a stage game G. First, some notation. Deﬁne a
cycle of length k
(k
￿ 1
) as a
(k
+1
)-tuple c
=
( v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
;v k
+1
=v 1
),w h e r ev s
6
= v tfor s
6
= t,
s
;t
2
f 1
;2
;
:
:
:
;k
g, and each vt belongs to V. Since the number of outcomes is ﬁnite, so is
the number of possible cycles. For a cycle c of length k, deﬁne the average cycle losses for
the players, denoted by d
(c
)
=
( d 1
( c
)
;d 2
( c
)
;
:
:
:
;d n
(c
)
),b yd i
(c
)
=1
k å
k
t
= 1
( v t
+ 1
i
￿v t
i
)
￿
;i
2N .
Deﬁne dG as the set of average cycle losses from cycles over outcomes in G. This set is also
ﬁnite.
Proposition 1 The set of feasible outcomes in the inﬁnitely repeated game G¥ with loss aver-
sion evaluation and a
= 0 is equal to the set of convex combinations of elements of dG, multi-
plied (coordinatewise) by l.
Proof: Take an inﬁnite payoff stream v
=
( v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
). We show that the utilities of the players
from this stream is equal to a convex combination of elements of dG multiplied (coordinate by
coordinate by) l.
Fix T
￿ 2, and take ˜ vT
=
( v 1
;v 2
;
:
:
:
;v T
).F i n d t h eﬁ r s tc y c l e i n˜ v T . Denote it c1 and its
length k1. Remove the ﬁrst k1 elements of this cycle (all except the last one) from ˜ vT,a n dw e
are left with a payoff stream k1 elements shorter than ˜ vT. Denote it ˜ vT1. From the deﬁnition of
15ui,
ui
(˜ vT
)
=
l i
T
T
å
t
= 2
( v t
￿v t
￿ 1
)
￿
=
l i k 1
T
d i
( c
)
+
￿
T
￿k 1
T
￿
u i
(˜ v T 1
)
:
Continue with the ﬁrst cycle remaining in ˜ vT1, denoting it c2 and its length k2. Continue until
no cycles remain. Denote the number of cycles by r and the length of the remaining stream ˜ vTr
by kr
+1.S i n c e˜ v T rcontains no cycles, we have kr
+1
￿
j S
j . Thus,
ui
(˜ vT
)
=l i
r
å
j
= 1
k j
T
d i
( c j
)
+l i
k r
+1
T
u i
(˜ v T r
)
:
When T approaches inﬁnity, the last term is negligible, and
ui
(v
)
= lim
T
!¥
supli
r
(T
)
å
j
=1
kj
T
di
(cj
)
forall i
2N,s ou
(v
)is a convexcombinationof averagecyclelosses,multipliedcoordinatewise
by l.
For the other direction, we are given a convex combination,
ui
= li
r
å
j
=1
ajdi
(cj
)
with å
r
j
=1aj
= 1, aj
> 0
8j,a n dd
(c j
)
2 d G
8j .T a k eµ j
=
b2 s a j
c,f o rﬁ x e ds
￿ 1. Create
a stream of outcomes giving each cycle µj times, excluding the last element of the cycle each
time except the last. The number of cycles is no greater than 2s, so we have a ﬁnite length
stream. Repeat this stream inﬁnitely many times, and we have a payoff stream whose payoff
is close to that of the ﬁnite stream. As we increase s,
µj
år
k
=1µk gets closer to aj, and the payoff
valuation approaches the desired one. As s tends to inﬁnity, we receive the desired result.
(Proposition 1)
We have thus characterized the set of feasible payoffs that can be achieved by the players.
We now examine which of these payoffs are individually rational, and therefore can be reached
in an equilibrium.
165.2 Individual Rationality
A payoff is individually rational for a player if it is at least as large as the minimal payoff
that she can ensure for herself (against all the others acting together, but not with correlated
mixtures). Thus, xi is an individually rational payoff for player i if
xi
￿ min
s
￿i
2S
￿i
max
si
2Si
Ui
(s
)
As t r a t e g ys
￿iachieving this value will be denoted an optimal punishment strategy against
player i. Our ﬁrst step is to characterize optimal punishment strategies. First we look at a
number of examples, with two players. The punisher in each case is player 2, the column
player.
Example 1:
L R
T 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
The severest punishment that player 2 can inﬂict is by mixing her two pure actions with
equal probabilitieseach round. Whateverstrategy player1 follows, her expected payoff change
per period is 1
2,g i v i n ga na v e r a g el o s so f1
4per period.
Example 2:
L R
T 1, 1 0, 0
B 1, 1 0, 0
For this game the severest punishment player 2 can inﬂict on player 1 is by playing L at
even stages and R at odd stages. This gives a ﬁxed change of 1 per period for player 1, which
is an average loss of 1
2 per period.
Example 3:
L M R
T 6, 0 0, 0 4,0
B 0, 0 6, 0 4,0
If player 2 mixes between L and M
with equal probabilitiesat each stage, player1 has an average change of 3 per period. However,
player 2 can punish even more severely. An optimal punishment strategy of player 2 is: play
R in stage 1. For stages after the ﬁrst, if the outcome gave player 1 a payoff of 0, then play R.
OtherwisemixL andM withequal probabilities. Thepayoffstream will containapproximately
1
3 each of the three outcomes 6, 4 and 0 for player 1. Every 0 is followed by a 4, every 4 is
17followed by either a 6 or a 0 (equal probabilities), and every 6 is followed by either a 6 or a 0
(equal probabilities). Taking the averages, the expected change per period in player 1’s payoffs
is 10
3 , which is greater than 3.
From these three examples, it can be seen that optimal punishment strategies must some-
times include almost only mixed actions (i.e. the set of stages at which a pure action is taken is
ﬁnite), must sometimes include almost only pure actions, must sometimes include an inﬁnite
number of both, and may depend on the history. The following proposition establishes the
existence of an optimal punishment strategy which is stationary (i.e. it depends only on the
previous outcome).
Proposition 2 An optimal punishment strategy against player i exists, in which the actions of
the other players at each stage are a function only of the actions in the last stage of the history,
and this function is the same at every stage (i.e. it is stationary).
Proof: The problem of ﬁnding an optimal punishment strategy is equivalent to ﬁnding
an optimal punishment strategy in the following stochastic game. The states are the possible
action n-tuples of the stage game, previously denoted by S. The payoff to player i at staget
+1
from the actions at this stage is a function of her payoff in the stage game at stage t (which is a
function of the state) and her payoff in the stage game at stage t
+1. This function is exactly
(vt
+1
￿vt
)
￿
=
( h i
( s t
+ 1
)
￿h i
( s t
)
)
￿,w h e r es t
+1is the action tuple at stage t
+1a n ds tis the
state at staget
+1, which is the action tuple at staget. The transition rule is that (from any state
at staget), the newstate at staget
+1 is the action tupleplayed at staget, i.e. st. This stochastic
game has the state-independent-transition property, and therefore according to Solan (1998),
the other players N
n
fi
ghave stationary optimal punishment strategies when the evaluation of
the payoffs is according to the limit of the averages, as it is in our game. (Proposition 2)
In calculating the optimal punishment strategy (according to the proposition it is sufﬁcient
to ﬁnd the optimal action after each outcome), one must take into account both the expected
one-round differences, and also the expected distribution over the outcomes before the next
stage. As the following proposition shows, it is not enough to maximize the one-round differ-
ences in a “greedy” manner.
18Proposition 3 Maximizing the expected one-round differences in material payoffs for a player
(playing “greedy”) is not necessarily an optimal punishment.
Proof: To provethis statement it sufﬁces toﬁnd a gameinwhich“greedy” is not an optimal
punishment. We take the stage game to be the battle of the sexes (Section 2.2). Player 2 is the
punisher.
We ﬁrst calculate the “greedy” strategy for Player 2. There are three states, corresponding
to outcomes 0, 1, and 2 for Player 1. For each state k
2
f 0
;1
;2
g , the strategy speciﬁes a
probability qk of playing the ﬁrst action. Denote a strategy by the triplet
(q0
;q1
;q2
), with qk
being the probability that Player 1 plays A in round t
+1 if the payoff in round t to Player 1
was k. Simple calculations show that the optimal strategy to maximize expected one-round
differences is
(1
3
;1
; 1
3
).
Now assume that “greedy” is an optimal punishment strategy, i.e. it ensures that the pun-
ishment to Player 1 is at least v, with v being the value of the stochastic game (we will reach a
contradiction to this assumption).
By the same arguments used in the previous proposition, Player 1 has an optimal stationary
strategy ensuring that the punishment will not exceed v. In particular, this strategy is a best
response against the “greedy” strategy played by Player 2, since we assumed that Player 1
cannot get a punishment less severe than v against it.
Calculation shows that any stationary best response against “greedy” is of the form s1
=
(1
;0
;r2
), with r2 any probability. Since we assumed that “greedy” is optimal for Player 2, for
some value of r2, s1 is optimal for Player 1. However, there is a better strategy than “greedy”
against any such s1,w h i c hi s
(0
;1
;1
).
Therefore, assuming that “greedy” is an optimal punishment strategy for Player 2 leads us
to the fact that none of the s1 strategies are optimal, whereas the same assumption led us to the
fact that one of them is optimal. Therefore, “greedy” is not optimal. Proposition 3
6 Concluding Remarks
In the previous sections, we have examined the effects of assuming reference dependence and
loss aversion in repeated game situations. The exact assumptions we used focused on inter-
19period losses, while disregarding the effect of interperiod gains. This kind of assumption has
a drawback when the number of periods is ﬁnite, and there is scope to include the effect of
gains in future research on ﬁnitely repeated games. Another restriction which could be relaxed
is the assumption of extreme loss aversion (the utility of material payoffs is negligible relative
to the utility of changes). However, the tradeoff between utility of material payoffs and util-
ity of changes severely complicates the analysis. As the three examples at the beginning of
Section 5.2 show, the construction of “optimal” punishments is not trivial, and while giving
an existence proof, we leave open the question of how to construct an optimal punishment in
general situations.
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